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I.  Introduction 
 In the comments section following a Huffington Post article, one commenter wrote, 
“look at the picture of this guy.  Do you realy [sic] need to do a background check? One look 
and the answer shou;d [sic] have been ‘no, you can’t have a gun’.” [sic]1  This commenter 
was referring to a photograph of Jared Lee Loughner, the twenty-two-year-old man 
allegedly responsible for shooting Congresswoman Gabrielle Gifford, killing six people, and 
wounding thirteen others at a political rally in Tuscon, Arizona.2  In the photograph 
appearing on the Huffington Post article, a bald Loughner is smirking directly into the 
camera.  As one publication described, “[h]e grabs the viewer with his eyes, looking straight 
ahead and not backing down or showing any sign of shame or remorse.” 3 The Huffington 
Post commenter’s quote illustrates the prejudicial effect of releasing mug shot photographs 
to the press.   
 United States courts have long recognized the prejudicial nature of submitting a 
defendant’s mug shot into evidence during trial.  In Barnes v. United States, the court stated, 
““[t]he double-shot picture, with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar 
                                                        
1 Jared Lee Loughner’s Mug Shot (PHOTO), HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2011, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/10/jared-lee-loughner-mug-shot-
photo_n_807042.html. 
2 Josh Gerstein, Media wins on Loughner mugshots, loses for now on search warrants, 
POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0211/Media_wins_on_Loughner_mugshots_l
oses_for_now_on_search_warrants.html. 
3 Jared Lee Loughner mugshot disturbs viewers (PHOTO), GLOBALPOST (Jan. 10, 2011, 10 PM), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/america-and-the-world/110110/jared-lee-
loughner-mugshot-disturbs-viewers-photos. 
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from ‘wanted’ posters in the post office, motion pictures and television, that the inference 
that the person involved has a criminal record, or has at least been in trouble with the  
police, is natural, perhaps automatic.”4  Some courts have guidelines that regulate the 
submission of mug shot photographs into evidence.  For instance, the First Circuit does not 
allow prosecutors to submit photographs that imply that the defendant has a prior criminal 
record and that suggest the source of the photographs.5  
 While these guidelines discuss the admission of mug shot photos to courtrooms 
during trials, they do not discuss the impact of releasing mug shot photographs to the 
media during an ongoing trial.  Rather than discuss the evidentiary function of mug shot 
photographs in courtroom proceedings, this comment focuses on how the release of a 
defendant’s mug shot photograph to the media implicates a defendant’s privacy rights.   
 Currently, circuits have split over whether releasing a defendant’s mug shot 
photograph to the media violates the defendant’s right of privacy.  The Sixth Circuit in 
Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice held that no privacy rights are implicated when 
mug shots are disclosed to the media during “ongoing criminal proceedings in which the 
names of the indicted suspects have already been made public and in which the arrestees 
have already made court appearances.”6  On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Karantsalis v. Department of Justice held that mug shot disclosures implicate privacy 
rights.7  Both Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis discussed whether the release of a 
                                                        
4 Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509, 510–11 (D.C. Cir 1966).  
5 U.S. v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 1978). 
6 Detroit Free Press v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1996).  
7 Karantsalis v. Detroit Free Press, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir.  2011).  
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defendant’s mug shot photo to the press violated Exemption 7(c) of the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”), 8 which prohibits the disclosure of government records that  
could “reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy”9   
 This comment argues that the release of a defendant’s mug shot to the press violates 
Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which intended to preserve a reasonable expectation of personal 
privacy.  Even if the defendant has already made a courtroom appearance, the release of a 
defendant’s mug shot to the press during an ongoing criminal proceeding negatively 
impacts the defendant’s personal privacy long after the end of the criminal proceeding.     
The long-lasting effects of the release of a mug shot constitute a violation of a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Section two of this comment explores the legal 
background of accessing documents in government possession.  Specifically, this section 
examines Karantsalis, Detroit Free Press, the legislative history of FOIA and Exemption 7(c), 
and first amendment rights to access government information.  Section three analyzes the 
theoretical underpinnings of privacy as a legal right.  This comment’s ultimate purpose is to 
explore FOIA’s application to mug shot photographs.  However, section three also discusses 
Supreme Court and common law tort jurisprudence on privacy, because they are helpful in 
defining privacy interests.  Section four explores the impact that the release of mug shot 
photographs to the press has on privacy even after the end of a criminal proceeding.   In 
addition, section four presents social science evidence, which shows that any public benefit 
of releasing mug shots to the press is far from conclusive.  Finally, section five concludes 
                                                        
8 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95.  
9 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96. 
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this comment by discussing possible solutions to the conflict between the defendant’s right 
to privacy and the public’s right to know.   
II. Legal Background on Accessing Government Information 
A. Introduction to FOIA 
 FOIA allows any member of the public to receive information from federal 
government agencies.10  However, the Act does not apply to the courts, to Congress, and to 
local and state government records.11   The seeds of FOIA grew from the emphasis on 
government secrecy during World War II and from the activities of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy.12  President Lyndon B. Johnson signed FOIA into law in 1966,13 but the law did 
not go into effect until 1967.14  Before the passage of FOIA, an individual had the burden to 
prove a right to access government documents.15  After the passage of FOIA, the 
government had the burden to justify withholding information requested by an 
individual.16   
                                                        
10U.S. Department of State Information Access Guide, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4 (Nov. 17, 
2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/128321.pdf. 
11 YOUR RIGHT TO FEDERAL RECORDS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT, GSA, OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVICES AND COMMUNICATIONS FEDERAL CITIZEN 
INFORMATION CENTER, 1 (NOV. 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/right_to_federal_records09.pdf. 
12 112 CONG. REC. 67,13007 (1966), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/112%20Cong.%20Rec.%2013007%2
0(1966%20Source%20Book).pdf. 
13 HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND 
APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 44 (1999).  
14 UNITED STATED DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: LEARN. 
15 A Citizen’s Guide On Using The Freedom Of Information Act And The Privacy Act Of 1974 To 
Request Government Records, H.R. REP. NO. 109–226, at 3.  
16 Id. at 3.  
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 FOIA’s purpose was to compel federal government agencies to fully disclose 
documents that members of the public requested.17  However, FOIA lists nine categories of 
information, known as “exemptions,” which permit the government to withhold from the 
public information that falls into these exemption categories.18  Exemption 7(c) is the 
category at issue in this comment.  Today, Exemption 7(c) applies to, “records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”19  Essentially, while 
FOIA creates avenues to access government information, it does not create an unqualified 
public right to access this information.   
B. Sixth Circuit: Detroit Free Press v.  Department of Justice  
 In Detroit Free Press, the Detroit Free Press requested under FOIA the release of the 
mug shots of eight defendants who were then indicted and awaiting trial.20  By the time the 
case reached the Sixth Circuit, the defendants’ trial had commenced and the defendants had 
appeared in court.   The Department of Justice relied on Exemption 7(c) to reject the 
newspaper’s request for the mug shots.21  FOIA Exemption 7(c) applies when the requested 
information is (1) “compiled for law enforcement purposes;” (2) is “reasonably . . . expected 
                                                        
17 S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965) (stating FOIA’s purpose to “establish a general 
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempt under the clearly 
delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the 
press may obtain information wrongly withheld.”) 
18 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 10. 
19 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, §1802, 100 Stat. 
3207 (1986) (subsequently amended). 
20  Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95.  
21 Id. 
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to constitute an invasion of personal privacy;” and (3) the request’s “intrusion into private 
matters [is] deemed ‘unwarranted’ after balancing the need for protection of private 
information against the benefit to be obtained by disclosure of information concerning the  
workings of components of our federal government.”22   
 The court reasoned that while the mug shots were “compiled for law  
enforcement,”23 defendants in mug shots “who were already indicted, who had already 
made court appearances after their arrests, and whose names had already been made 
public in connection with an ongoing criminal prosecution” could not claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to justify withholding their mug shots.24  Specifically, the court 
explained, “the need or desire to suppress the fact that an individual depicted in the mug 
shot was booked on criminal charges is drastically lessened in an ongoing criminal 
proceeding such as the one precipitating the dispute presently before us.”25 Moreover, the 
court stated that “the personal privacy of an individual is not necessarily invaded simply 
because that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the disclosure of information 
in the possession of government agencies.”26    Finally, the court stated, “[e]ven had an 
encroachment upon personal privacy been found, however, a significant public interest in 
the disclosure of the mug shots of the individuals . . .  could, nevertheless, justify the release 
of that information to the public.”27  For example, “release of a photograph of a defendant 
                                                        
22 Id. at 96.   
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 97. 
27 Id. at 97–98.  
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can more clearly reveal the government’s glaring error in detaining the wrong person for 
an arrest than can any reprint of only the name of an arrestee.”28 
C. Eleventh Circuit: Karantsalis v. Department of Justice  
 In Karantsalis, the plaintiff, a free-lance journalist, requested the release of mug 
shots of Luis Giro, who appeared in court to plead guilty to securities fraud.29  The Marshals 
Service rejected the plaintiff’s request pursuant to Exemption 7(c).30   The court noted the 
difference in protocol for releasing mug shot photos between the Eleventh Circuit and the 
Sixth Circuit.31  While the court concluded that the mug shot photos were “compiled for law 
enforcement purposes,” 32 it held that the mug shot release implicated a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  The plaintiff argued that Giro’s expectations of privacy was 
unreasonable because of his appearance in court to plead guilty, but the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim and noted that “a booking photograph does more than suggest guilt; it 
raises a unique privacy interest because it captures an embarrassing moment that is not 
normally exposed to the public eye.”33  Finally, the court explained, “the public obtains no 
discernable interest from viewing the booking photographs, except perhaps the negligible 
value of satisfying voyeuristic curiosities.”34  The court held that FOIA Exemption 7(c) 
blocked the release of Giro’s mug shot to the press.   
D. Legislative History of FOIA and Exemption 7(c) 
                                                        
28 Id. at 98.   
29 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499, 503. 
30 Id. at 499. 
31 Id. at 501. 
32 Id. at 502. 
33 Id. at 503.  
34 Id. at 504.  
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1. Legislative history of FOIA 
 The legislative history of FOIA does not fully support the press’ right to access mug 
shot photographs.  A 1965 Senate report introducing FOIA recognized the need to protect 
certain “important rights of privacy with respect to certain information in Government files 
. . . .”35  Similarly, House Representative Robert Dole held that while a healthy democracy 
cannot accommodate secrecy, the government must be “realistic” and “recognize that 
certain Government information must be protected and that the right of individual privacy 
must be respected.”36   Thus, although FOIA creates a presumption of openness for 
government documents, it also recognizes that important privacy rights can trump this 
presumption.  In fact, the 1965 Senate report that introduced FOIA clarified that balancing 
privacy interests with the public’s right to know is neither an easy nor impossible task and 
observed that “to protect one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be 
abrogated or substantially subordinated.”37  Accordingly, FOIA recognizes the possibility 
that the interest of full disclosure may be “abrogated” for the interest of a defendant’s 
privacy rights in withholding mug shot photographs from the press. 
2. Legislative history of Exemption 7(c) 
 The legislative history of FOIA, together with the history of Exemption 7(c), weighs 
against the disclosure of a defendant’s mug shot to the public.  In the 1967 version of FOIA, 
Exemption 7 protected “investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except 
                                                        
35 S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965).  
36 112 CONG. REC., supra note 12, at 74.  
37 S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965).  
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to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency.”38  However, the 1967 
wording of Exemption 7 was too expansive and allowed government to withhold a broad  
category of information.39  Thus, in 1974, Congress amended FOIA and added six specific  
categories of information to which Exemption 7 applied.40  One of those six categories,  
Exemption 7(c), allowed the government to withhold “investigatory records compiled for 
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records 
would . . . constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”41  In 1986, Congress 
amended Exemption 7(c) once again and broadened its scope of protection for personal 
privacy.42  The 1986 version of Exemption 7(c) is how the current version of the exemption 
reads and it withholds, “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, 
but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . 
. . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy[.]”43   
 The difference in the language between the 1974 and 1986 version of  
Exemption 7(c) illustrates the general trend of increasing the protection of personal 
privacy.  The 1986 amendment of Exemption 7(c), along with other FOIA amendments, was 
a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.44  The 1986 amendments were in response to 
                                                        
38 Id. 
39 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE, 2004 EDITION: EXEMPTION 7, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption7.htm. 
40 The Freedom of Information Act And Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–502, 88 Stat. 
1561, 1563 (1974) (subsequently amended). 
41 Id. 
42 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 39.  
43 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, supra note 19.   
44 HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, supra note 13, at 55.  
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studies citing evidence that drug dealers used information from FOIA requests to learn 
about ongoing criminal investigations and to retaliate against informants who provided 
information to law enforcement.45  Senator Orrin Hatch declared, “FOIA contains an 
exemption that is supposed to protect informants, but even a quick look at that [1974] 
language reveals that the . . . protection is not sufficient.”46 
 Whereas in 1974 information receiving exemption from government disclosure 
“would” have to “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” in 1986 such  
information “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”  The “would disclose” language was a “dangerous standard,” because it 
did not “clearly protect that information.” 47  Specifically, “[t]he FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies . . . testified that the ‘would’ language in the exemption place[d] 
undue strictures on agency attempts to protect against the harms specified in Exemption 
7’s subparts.”48  Essentially, “would” implies a higher threshold to withhold information 
than the “could reasonably be expected” standard and thus shows Congress’ attempt to 
ease the government’s burden to withhold information.49   
                                                        
45 132 CONG. REC. S14033 (Sept. 27, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“the language 
of our amendment addresses the problem which was the concern of the original proposal, 
the use of FOIA by sophisticated enterprises to learn about ongoing criminal 
investigations.”); 132 CONG. REC. S14038–40 (Sept. 27, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch) (listing studies showing evidence that drug dealers used information from FOIA 
requests to retaliate against informants).  
46 132 CONG. REC. S14038–40 (Sept. 27, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).  
47 Id.  
48 132 CONG. Rec. H.9462–68 (Oct. 8, 1986) (Statement of Reps. Glenn English and Thomas 
Kindness). 
49 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 39. 
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 Additional evidence of the intent to increase privacy protection comes from the 
contrast between Exemption 7(c)’s application solely to “investigatory” records of law 
enforcement in 1974 and the exemption’s application to “records or information” of law 
enforcement in 1986.   Senator Hatch explained the problem with the 1974 FOIA language: 
“[i]f a request would disclose an informant’s identity, but is not an investigatory record, it 
must be disclosed. . . . Is this the kind of protection that our informants deserve. [sic]”50  
The replacement of “investigatory” records with “records or information” effectively 
expanded the scope of the exemption and  guaranteed that Exemption 7 protected sensitive 
law enforcement information regardless of the specific format or record through which the 
agency maintained the information.51  The 1986 language change is noteworthy, because 
law enforcement records often contain the name of individuals who are not targets of 
investigations.52  However, names that appear in law enforcement records elicit a strong 
presumption of wrongdoing.53  Thus, Congress recognized the need to protect the privacy 
rights of “innocent” parties mentioned in law enforcement records.  
 Finally, Congressional intent to broaden the privacy protection is especially 
apparent from the language in Exemption 6.  This exemption withholds, “personnel and 
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”54  The “clearly” unwarranted invasion of 
privacy standard is harder to satisfy than Exemption 7(c)’s “reasonably expected” invasion 
                                                        
50 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 45.   
51 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 48. 
52 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 7(C), 566, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7c.pdf. 
53 Id. at 564.  
54 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6). 
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of privacy standard.55  A 1986 Congressional Record stated, “[b]ecause exemption 7(C) and 
exemption 6 are nearly identical, it would be inappropriate to make any changes that 
increase the difference between these two privacy standards.  It is already easier to 
withhold law enforcement information on privacy grounds under exemption 7(C) than it is  
to withhold other information under exemption 6.”56 
 In sum, reading the legislative history of FOIA alongside the history of Exemption  
7(c) illustrates Congress’ intent to broaden the protection of personal privacy interests.  
Under Exemption 7(c), the government’s burden of proving its decision to withhold 
personal information is less than that under Exemption 6.  The overall spirit of FOIA 
Exemption 7(c) does not support the release of mug shot photos to the press.  
E. The First Amendment Right to Access Government Documents 
 Finally, a discussion on legal access to government information would be remiss 
without noting First Amendment access rights.  Both Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis 
involved the press’ attempt to access information through a FOIA request.  Case law reveals 
that journalists cannot always rely on the First Amendment to access government 
information if a government agency rejects their FOIA request.  Although the First 
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the 
press . . . ,”57  the amendment does not guarantee the press an unqualified right to access 
information.  The Supreme Court in Zemel v. Rusk held “[t]he right to speak and publish 
                                                        
55 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 52, at 562.  
56 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 48. 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
Lisa Chinai 
Circuit Review Comment 
AWR Submission 
05/14/12 
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”58  In Houchins v. KQED, 
the Supreme Court further stated that “[t]he public’s interest in knowing about its 
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect.  
The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets 
Act.”59  Essentially, the media has a qualified right to access government information under 
the First Amendment.   
 The examples above show how the First Amendment provides only a qualified right 
to access government information.  This qualified right complements FOIA, because FOIA 
does not cover access to certain categories of government information like judicial 
proceedings and documents.60  The Supreme Court has also spelled out many examples of 
qualified First Amendment rights to access judicial proceedings.  Courtroom access is an 
example of a qualified First Amendment right.   In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the 
Court recognized a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials,61 but the 
Court has yet to extend this qualified right to access civil trials.62 In addition, the Court has 
also announced a qualified First Amendment right to access court documents like voir dire 
transcripts.63   
                                                        
58 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).  
59 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).  
60 GSA, supra note 11. 
61 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. VA, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980).  
62 Christopher Dunn, Column: Rediscovering the First Amendment Right of Access (New York 
Law Journal), NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://www.nyclu.org/oped/column-rediscovering-first-amendment-right-of-access-new-
york-law-journal. 
63 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of CA, Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1984).  
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 Courtroom camera access is another example of a qualified First Amendment right.  
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court held, “[i]n the first place . . . 
there is no constitutional right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast.”64 
The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed states to televise coverage of criminal proceedings in 
their courts.65   In Chandler v. Florida, the Court approved Florida’s experiment to allow 
electronic media and still photographic coverage of criminal trials.66  However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has never allowed the media to bring cameras into its courtroom.67  Justice 
Antonin Scalia commented, “If I really thought the American people would get educated, I’d 
be all for [televised courtroom proceedings].”68  The Justice went on to explain, “[f]or every 
10 people who sat through our proceedings . . . there would be 10,000 would see nothing 
but a 30-second take out.”69 In other words, televising proceedings would create “a 
misimpression of the Supreme Court.”70   In contrast, Justice Elena Kagan appears to 
support camera access, because she believes that this access educates the public.71  These 
Justices’ arguments are noteworthy, because they pick up on the themes that this comment 
will discuss in the next section on why certain information should remain private.  In 
                                                        
64 Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978).  
65 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 560–61 (1981).  
66 Id. at 560–61.  
67Tony Mauro, Let the cameras roll: Cameras in the courtroom and the myth of Supreme 
Court exceptionalism, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (November 14, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202532222249&Let_the_cameras_rol
l&slreturn=1. 
68 Dan Rivoli, Scalia, Breyer Weigh in on Televised High Court Arguments, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TIMES (OCT. 6, 2011 9:07AM), http://m.ibtimes.com/scalia-breyer-televised-
arguments-226289.html. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Tony Mauro, supra note 43. 
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essence, all of the examples in this section show that the media cannot always claim a 
general right to access government information under the First Amendment.  Thus, the 
Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis cannot successfully rely on the First Amendment to 
access mug shot photographs.   
III.  Definition of Privacy 
 The decisions in Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis, as well as the language and 
legislative history of FOIA leave one question unanswered: what is privacy?  John B. Young 
once commented, “[p]rivacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognized than described.”72  
In other words, “[w]hen people claim that privacy should be protected, it is unclear  
precisely what they mean.” 73 The Supreme Court’s position on privacy suggests that  
it is not a singular concept.  Instead, privacy is a multi-faceted concept and protects many 
categories of rights.74 Part A traces the legal history of privacy rights most applicable to 
mug shot disclosures.  A useful analogy for understanding privacy would be the history of 
blackmail and privacy tort law.  Part B addresses cultural and social justifications for 
privacy laws.  Before tracking the legal evolution of privacy, this section first presents a 
framework of privacy in order to guide the discussion on the evolution of this concept as a 
legal right.   
A. Development of privacy law most applicable to mug shot disclosures 
                                                        
72 HEATHER MACNEIL, WITHOUT CONSENT: THE ETHICS OF DISCLOSING PERSONAL INFORMATION IN 
PUBLIC ARCHIVES 9 (1992).  
73 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480 (2006).  
74 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (citing an implied constitutional right to 
privacy); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding a woman’s privacy right to make 
decisions on her medical care); See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that 
wiretapping conversations on a public telephone booth constitutes an unreasonable 
violation of privacy) 
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 Because “privacy is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single 
essence,”75 author Daniel J. Solove argues that “privacy violations involve a variety of types 
of harmful or problematic activities.”76  Specifically, people “should understand privacy as a 
set of protections against a plurality of distinct but related problems.”77   In essence, society 
designed privacy as a protection against problems that hinder activities that it values.78 
“Identify[ing] and understand[ing] the different kinds of socially recognized privacy 
violations” can help create a taxonomy for privacy that facilitates the development of 
privacy law.79  
 Such a taxonomy outlines “four basic groups of harmful activities: (1) information  
collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.”80 
Each of these four groups covers specific categories that are harmful to privacy. 81 For 
instance, “disclosure” is one of the seven specific harms to privacy within the “information 
dissemination” group.82  This comment adopts this framework in analyzing the privacy 
implications of mug shot disclosures.  Specifically, this section examines “disclosure,” as 
this category is most relevant to a discussion on mug shot disclosures.    
 “Disclosure” in the privacy context involves “the revelation of truthful information  
                                                        
75 Solove, supra note 73, at 485. 
76 Id. at 480. 
77 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 171 (2008).  
78 Id. at 174. 
79 Solove, supra note 73, at 483.     
80 Id. at 488. 
81 Id. at 490–91.  
82 Id. at 523. 
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about a person that impacts the way others judge her character.”83 Untruthful information 
undoubtedly impacts a person’s reputation, but some individuals may inquire why the law 
would protect against the disclosure of truthful information.  “Disclosure” laws aim to 
prevent reputational harms.84  “Disclosure” is an apt vehicle for analyzing the privacy 
implications of mug shot disclosures, because mug shots reveal truthful information of a 
person’s criminal record.  As section three will discuss in-depth, these disclosures also elicit 
reputational judgment by the public.   
 Privacy and reputation are “intimately bound together”:85  
[y]our reputation, of course, is what other people think of you.  What they 
think of you is, obviously, a function of what they know about you or think 
they know about you.  Hence any study of reputation is also a study of the 
flow of information about other people—and the power to control that flow. . 
. . Many people earn and keep a reputation not because of what people know 
about them so much as because of what other people do not know.  For 
people with skeletons in their closet, reputation depends on secrecy and 
privacy.86 
 
The historical origins of laws against disclosure reveal that the government designed these 
laws to protect against reputational harms.  Even though blackmail is distinguishable from 
disclosure in that it “involves a threat of disclosure rather than an actual disclosure,”87 this 
section examines blackmail law under a discussion of “disclosure,” because it protects 
                                                        
83 Id. at 491. 
84 Solove, supra note 73, at 529; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUIDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL 
AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 9–10 (2007). 
85 Friedman, supra note 84, at 4. 
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against the revelation of truthful information that could lead to reputational harms.88  
 Blackmail occurs when an individual extorts money from another by threatening to  
disclose information or rather, “skeletons in the man’s closet.”89  The following example in 
a nineteenth-century context demonstrates how blackmail laws aimed to protect 
reputation: 
The blackmailer knows a dirty secret about someone.  He knows, let us say, 
that his banker, this pillar of the church, this leader of the community . . . 
fathered a bastard child.  The blackmailer threatens to tell the truth unless 
the banker pays. . . .  Threatening to punish the blackmailer was no doubt 
supposed to deter him, but by the same token it protected the banker’s guilty 
secret.  Here, the law protects a “respectable” man who has broken the rules. 
. . . There is no point trying to squeeze money out of a pauper, or out of 
someone with no reputation to loose.90 
 
In other words, blackmail laws does “not protect the innocent but curiously enough . .  
 
. protect[s] the guilty,”91 who wished to keep their guilty information private.   
  
 Author Lawrence M. Freidman holds that blackmail laws were an “example of the 
legal shield protecting reputation. . . .”92  He inquires, “[i]n a society that exalts freedom of 
speech and freedom of contract and bargaining, even sharp and relentless bargaining, why 
do we have laws against blackmail?”93 Freidman posits: “Did blackmail laws actually deter? 
Doubtful.  But the point of the laws seems reasonably clear.  The blackmail laws were 
supposed to protect respectable people with guilty secrets.  The laws were supposed to 
                                                        
88 Friedman, supra note 84, 10; 86–97. 
89 Id. at 97. 
90 Id. at 66. 
91 Id. at 10. 
92 Id. at 99. 
93 Id. at 84. 
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keep the past safely buried.”94  Ultimately, blackmail laws function as privacy laws that 
allow individuals to safeguard truthful information that has the potential to ruin their 
reputations.  Mug shots are an example of information that is truthful, but harmful to one’s 
reputation.  Mug shots represent the “past,” which most people want to keep private.  
Blackmail laws protect against the disclosure of both truthful and untruthful information, 
because a blackmailer cannot claim as a defense to violating a blackmail law that he or she 
threatened to disclose truthful information.95  Nonetheless, blackmail laws essentially  
provide one type of legal analogy for safeguarding against the disclosure of mug shots. 
 More notable than the promulgation of blackmail laws is Samuel Warren’s and Louis  
Brandeis’ 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The Right to Privacy.”96 This article most 
famously articulates the privacy category of “disclosure.”  Warren and Brandeis were 
inspired to write their famous law review article from the disclosure of truthful 
information, namely, a non-salacious newspaper story on Warren’s daughter’s wedding  
festivities.97   
 In trying to discover a legal foundation for privacy rights, “Brandeis and Warren  
began by identifying the ‘mental pain and distress’ that resulted from the publication of 
true, but intimate private facts.”98  Solove explains that the “harms Warren and Brandeis 
                                                        
94 Id. at 98. 
95 Friedman, supra note 84, at 97. 
96 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandies, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  
97 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 7 (2000) (stating “Although the information wasn’t 
inherently salacious, Brandeis and Warren were appalled that a domestic ceremony would 
be  . . . discussed by strangers.”) 
98 Rosen, supra note 97, at 43; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 197.   
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spoke of are dignity harms.  The classic example of such a harm is reputational injury.”99  
Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article during the height of yellow journalism and 
the advent of the instant Kodak camera.100   Privacy needed protection, because 
“[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts 
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”101   
 Warren and Brandeis argued that the “existing law afford[ed] a principle  
which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual either by the too  
 
enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device  
 
for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.”102 The common law already “secure[d] to  
 
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,  
 
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”103 The right to privacy  
 
“implie[d] the right not merely to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, but to  
 
prevent its being depicted at all.”104   This conceptualization of privacy “asserted the ability  
 
to control the conditions of our own exposure as a legal right.”105   
                                                        
99 Solove, supra note 73, at 486.   
100 Friedman, supra note 84, at 214.   
101 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 197 (criticizing the press for “overstepping in 
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.  Gossip [was] no longer the 
resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade . . . [t]o satisfy a prurient 
taste”).   
102 Id. at 206. 
103 Id. at 198. 
104 Id. at 218.  
105 Rosen, supra note 97, at 44. 
Lisa Chinai 
Circuit Review Comment 
AWR Submission 
05/14/12 
 What remains peculiar is why Warren and Brandeis, men with good reputations, 
would be concerned with threats to privacy?106  Freidman argues, “although Warren and 
Brandeis did not say so (and perhaps did not even think so), no doubt some respectable 
people in fact had dark and dirty secrets to hide.  Even for these people, privacy—the veil of 
secrecy—was . . . an aspect of the social order that had to be protected.”107  For Warren and 
Brandeis, “[a]ny intrusion into the domestic circle would lead to scandal”108 and thus, 
privacy was “essential to human dignity.”109 
 Essentially, in the context of this comment, mug shots are prime examples of  
“instantaneous photographs”110 that capture a person’s “thoughts, emotions, and  
sensations”111 at a particular moment in time and undoubtedly are photographs that most 
individuals would prefer to keep private.  The impact of Warren’s and Brandeis’ law review 
article on privacy and disclosure laws today is highly evident.   Tort law recognizes the  
potential privacy violation resulting from the disclosure of truthful information.112   Under  
the “public disclosure of private facts” tort law, the plaintiff must prove “publicity of private 
facts highly offensive to a reasonable person which are not of a legitimate public 
interest.”113   This tort law “enables people to sue others for disclosing true information  
about them, even if the information was obtained through lawful means.”114  In addition, 
the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe embraced Warren’s and Brandeis’ article by 
                                                        
106 See Friedman, supra note 84, at 214.  
107 Id. 
108 Id.   
109 Id.  
110 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 195.  
111 Id.   
112 Rosen, supra note 97, at 45. 
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recognizing a right to privacy based on the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matter.”115  
 Ultimately, Solove’s privacy framework, blackmail laws, and privacy tort law all 
demonstrate ways in which laws simultaneously implicate privacy and reputational 
interests.  These examples provide a legal justification for why mug shot disclosures 
implicate FOIA’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” because they show how the American 
legal system has recognized that privacy violations stem from reputational harms caused 
by truthful disclosure of information.  In fact, other countries have laws that echo the 
design of American blackmail laws and privacy tort law.  For instance, in Argentina, the 
Civil Code prohibits “publishing photos, divulging correspondence, mortifying another’s 
customs or sentiments or disturbing his privacy by whatever means.”116 In Mexico, the 
Federal Civil Code “allows people to sue for ‘moral damage’ if one prints photographs of an 
individual that inflict ‘an injury in his sentiments, affections, or intimate life.’”117   In short, 
contrary to Detroit Free Press’ contention, the personal privacy of an individual is invaded 
when “that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the disclosure of information in 
the possession of government agencies.”118  Unfortunately, American privacy tort law is not 
an adequate protection for victims of mug shot disclosures, because victims must often 
suffer reputational harms before they can bring a cause of action.  Thus, in order to prevent 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
114 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 971 (2003).  
115 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).   
116 Solove, supra note 77, at 141. 
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reputational harms, the Supreme Court must hold that disclosure of mug shots violates an 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” under FOIA.   
B.  Why should the law keep certain truthful information private?  
 Whereas Part A presented a legal background on how privacy laws strive to address 
reputational harms, Part B examines sociological and psychological justifications of privacy 
laws.  Specifically, this part discusses why the law should protect against the disclosure of 
truthful information with the potential to harm one’s reputation.   
 Solove believes that “the value of privacy should be understood in terms of its 
contribution to society.”119  Specifically, “when privacy protects the individual, it does so 
because it is in society’s interest.   Individual liberties should be justified in terms of their 
social contributions.  Privacy is not just freedom from social control but is in fact a socially 
constructed form of protection.”120  However, many scholars criticize legal privacy 
protections and restrictions on the disclosure of truthful information.121   
 One general criticism of legal privacy protections is that they “inhibit a person’s  
ability to assess other people’s reputations and make accurate judgments about them.”122   
For instance, Judge Richard Posner views “the central issue in privacy law as ‘whether a 
person should have a right to conceal discreditable facts about himself’.”123 Particularly, 
Posner explains: “ ‘when people today decry lack of privacy, what they want, I think, is . . . 
more power to conceal information about themselves that others might use to their 
                                                        
119 Solove, supra note 77, at 173. 
120 Id. at 173–74.  
121 Solove, supra note 114, at 1032.    
122 Id.  
123 Solove, supra note 121; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 46 (1998). 
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disadvantage’.”124 By concealing truthful, but damaging information, people can “ ‘make 
advantageous transactions in employment and marriage markets. . .’.”125   Similarly, 
Richard Epstein argues that “ ‘the plea for privacy is often a plea for the right to  
misrepresent one’s self to the rest of the world’.”126  However, these critiques are based on 
many faulty assumptions.127   
 The first assumption that critics make is that “more disclosure will generally yield  
more truth.  In other words, more information about a person will make one’s judgment 
about that person more accurate.” 128  Solove illustrates that “the disclosure of private 
information can often lead to misjudgment”129 and argues that “the law can and should 
influence the way people judge each other.”130   “[A] strong social value in enabling people 
to make accurate assessment of others” certainly exists.131  For instance, having accurate 
information is essential when individuals must trust others with their finances and 
childcare.132  However, “[k]nowing certain information can distort one’s judgment of 
another rather than increase its accuracy.”133   
                                                        
124 Solove, supra note 121; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1981). 
125 Solove, supra note 121; RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 532 (1995).  
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Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV.  1, 12 (1994). 
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 Solove first tackles the question of “why should the law pay special attention to 
misjudgment based on private rather than public information.”134 Critics argue, “the 
problem of misunderstanding is not really a privacy problem because misunderstanding 
can occur with both private and public information.”135  However, Jeffrey Rosen observes 
that “ ‘[p]rivacy protects us from being misidentified and judged out of context in a world of 
short attention spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with 
knowledge’.”136  Furthermore, “when intimate [private] information is removed from its 
original context and revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the 
basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore, most memorable, tastes and 
preferences.”137  In sum, the critics are: 
correct that misunderstanding can occur in many ways, not exclusively 
through revelation of private information.  Just because this is so, however, 
need not tarnish Rosen’s insight.  Much misunderstanding occurs because of 
the disclosure of private information, and therefore, privacy is an important 
way of protecting against misunderstanding.  It may not be the exclusive way 
to safeguard being judged out of context, but there are many reasons why the 
disclosure of private information is particularly susceptible to 
misunderstanding.138   
 
 Reputation provides an example of how disclosure of private information is  
particularly susceptible to misunderstanding.139  Alan Westin argues that “ ‘individuals 
need to control information about the self because they have conflicting roles to play in 
                                                        
134 Id. at 1036. 
135 Id.  
136 Solove, supra note 114, at 1035–36; Rosen, supra note 97, at 8.  
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138 Id. at 1036–37. 
139 Id. at 1039. 
Lisa Chinai 
Circuit Review Comment 
AWR Submission 
05/14/12 
society and must present different selves at different times. . . .’ ”140 Thus, reputation needs 
privacy protection, because 
[e]veryone must cope with the fragility of reputation, on which the ability to 
function in society delicately hangs.  All who value their reputations care 
about how others judge them.  Reputation is especially important in one’s 
public roles, because these roles shape one’s career, relationship with much 
of society . . . The reality is that people lack much control over how they are 
judged.  One is constantly at the mercy of others—a precarious position to be 
in.  However, managing disclosures about one’s private life is an even greater 
and more difficult burden, making reputation all the more vulnerable.141 
 
In other words, privacy law that protects reputation benefits all of society.  This argument 
essentially expresses Solove’s general precept that privacy’s value lies in its value to 
society.  As Solove explains, “[s]ociety accepts that public reputations will be groomed to 
some degree. . . . Society protects privacy because it wants to provide individuals with some 
degree of influence over how they are judged in the public area.”142  In short, laws must 
protect against the disclosure of truthful private information “not only because private 
information will lead to judging out of context, but also because of the value of preserving 
partial control over how people are judged and enabling some limited degree of freedom 
from the harsh and often unfair judgments that everyone regularly encounters in 
public.”143   
 Note that scholars are not impervious to problems with privacy law regulating  
reputational judgment.  For instance, Eugene Volokh argues, “ ‘in a free speech regime, 
others’ definitions of me should primarily be molded by their own judgments, rather than 
                                                        
140 Solove, supra note 114, at 1037; ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967).  
141 Solove, supra note 114, at 1039 
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by my using legal coercion to keep them in the dark’.”144 In other words, “[i]f people desire 
to make bad judgments about others based on partial information, it is their prerogative.  
What business does the law have in telling people how they should judge other people?”145  
 The first response to this argument draws an analogy to evidence law.146  Evidence 
law can exclude relevant evidence from a trial because “it is more prejudicial than 
probative.”147  Similarly, although certain information may help in assessing a person’s 
character, the law must recognize that keeping such information private is necessary for a 
fair judgment.148  Second, legal regulation of private information benefits not just the 
individual, but also society.149  For instance, “the bright spotlight of the media can deter 
capable people from seeking public office . . . It can deter all those who have engaged in 
some deviant activity or who have a few eccentricities.  This has the result of de-
democratizing the public sphere to a select group of individuals. . . . ”150  In sum, the law 
should regulate private information, because 
[m]ost people have embarrassing moments in their past.  Everyone has done 
things  and regretted them later. . . . There is a great value in allowing 
individuals the opportunity to wipe the slate clean.  Society protects against 
such disclosures not  just to protect the individual, but to further society’s 
interest in providing people with incentives and room to change and grow.151  
 
Reputations need protection from truthful information and privacy law can provide  
                                                        
144 Solove, supra note 114, at 1047; Eugine Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV.  1049, 1093 (2000).   
145 Solove, supra note 114, at 1047.   
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this protection.    
 
 Finally, a second faulty assumption by critics of privacy is that gossip has an 
educational benefit in learning about human nature.152  While gossip in certain contexts has 
an educational value, in other contexts, gossip solely “satisf[ies] idle curiosity.”153  For 
instance, Solove asks, “What precisely is the educative value of a celebrity’s sex life, drug 
use, or dating history?”154  Moreover, in terms of private figures, “the educative function of 
gossip could readily be satisfied without revealing the identities of the individuals 
involved.”155  Finally, many disclosures about a person’s private life are made to people 
who do not need to judge that person.156  In short, disclosure of private information is often 
unnecessary, rather than educationally helpful.   
 Ultimately, this discussion has presented reasons why the law must keep certain 
truthful information private.  Because private information often represents only partial 
information about a person, disclosure of such information leads to character 
misjudgments and in turn, reputational problems.  The disclosure of private information 
can disadvantage society.  The law must protect private information in order to protect 
society from these disadvantages.   The justifications that Solove and other commentators 
provide for keeping certain information private help give meaning to “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” under FOIA.  Next, Section IV will illustrate how mug shot 
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disclosures implicate all of the problems that provide Solove and other commentators a 
legal justification for protecting privacy.   
IV.  Social Science Analysis 
 Part A will present social science research that illustrates how the release of mug 
shot photos violates reasonable expectations of privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(c).  
Evidence will suggest that mug shots create an unfavorable impression and diminish the 
public’s leniency towards the defendant in the mug shot.  Specifically, three studies 
demonstrate how mug shots affect public perceptions.  The results of these studies support 
the justifications in part two of this comment for why certain information should be 
private. 
A. Mug Shots Carry a Negative Connotation by Diminishing Assessments of 
Leniency  
 
 First, the Millicent H. Abel et al. study found that that attractiveness and smiling  
affect people’s attribution of guilt and punishment.157  The researchers showed participants  
four photos depicted in a mug shot style.158  The four mug shots contained a male or a 
female with either a felt smile or a neutral expression.159  The researchers told participants 
a crime scenario in which the mug shot subject may have allegedly been involved.160  The 
researchers designed the scenario “to induce suspicion of guilt but not certain guilt.”161  
                                                        
157 Millicent H. Abel et al., Attributions of Guilt and Punishment as Functions of Physical 
Attractiveness and Smiling, in THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 145(6), 700 (2006).  
158 Id. at 692. 
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Then, participants answered four questions on the mug shot subject.162 The first question 
asked the likelihood that the mug shot subject committed the crime; the second question 
asked the degree to which the mug shot subject should receive the benefit of the doubt; the 
third question asked the likelihood that the mug shot subject committed a crime in the 
past; and the fourth question asked the likelihood that the mug shot subject will commit a 
crime in the future.163 These four questions elicited the participant’s attributions of guilt on 
the mug shot subject.  Researchers then asked the participants how many years of 
imprisonment—from zero to sixty years—that they would impose on the mug shot subject 
assuming that the subject is guilty.164  This question measured participants’ leniency 
towards the mug shot subject.  Finally, participants rated the attractiveness of the mug shot 
subjects on a sliding scale.165   
 Although participants assigned the same level of guilt to smiling and non-smiling  
mug shot subjects,166 the study found a significant positive correlation between guilt and 
leniency for the mug shot subject whom the participants rated low in physical 
attractiveness and who was not smiling.167 The research ultimately summarized that “[i]f 
the target is unattractive, his or her smile may lead to leniency; whereas if the target is  
attractive, the target’s smile may lead to harsher punishment.”168  Therefore, “if a person is  
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actually guilty and physically unattractive, he or she should smile; whereas if the person is 
actually guilty and physically attractive, he or she should not smile.”169  
 Similarly, the Marianne LaFrance et al. study suggested that smiling affects how 
people attribute guilt and determine punishment of a person.170   Researchers gave 
participants mug shots of a person with varying degrees of a smile to a non-smile.171  
Researchers explained to them that school officials accused the person on the mug shot of 
cheating on an exam.172  Researchers asked the participants on the mug shot subject’s  
likelihood of cheating in the present scenario, in the past, and in the future.173  Researchers  
also asked participants the degree to which they believed that the mug shot subject should 
receive a benefit of the doubt.174  Finally, researchers asked the participants the degree of 
punishment the mug shot subject should receive, from no punishment to maximum 
punishment.175  The study found that compared to those subjects who did not smile, 
“leniency (granting the transgressor more benefit of the doubt and applying a less severe 
sentence) was given more to smiling targets, even though they were not seen as more likely 
to have cheated in the past, present, or future.”176  In essence, “smiling transgressors 
received significantly greater benefit of the doubt and less punishment than non-smiling  
                                                        
169 Id. 
170 Marianne LaFrance et al., Why Smiles Generate Lenience, in PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 21(3), 213 (1995).   
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transgressors.”177   
 Finally, the Lain et al. study illustrated that the nature of a mug shot influences 
readers’ appraisal of a news story accompanying the photo.178   Researchers gave 
participants a newspaper story with “little drama and about which few subjects could be 
expected to have a strong opinion.”179  Essentially, the news story was neutral.  The 
newspaper article contained a mug shot of a person with either a positive, negative, or 
neutral facial expression.180  However, one newspaper article had no accompanying mug  
shot.181 Researchers instructed participants to evaluate how the newspaper article  
portrayed the story subject among fourteen qualities, such as “unethical-ethical,” 
“impersonal-personal,” and “antisocial-social.”182  Results show that differences in readers’ 
appraisal of how the newspaper article portrayed the story subject were due primarily to 
the positive or negative nature of the mug shots. 183  In other words, “mug shots have a 
differential effect on the meaning newspaper readers attribute to individuals who are 
subjects of accompanying news stories.”184  The study states, “results suggested that 
readers who can see pictures of news story subjects are quicker to ascribe personal  
characteristics to those subjects than are readers who no such pictures.”185 The study goes  
on to caution:  
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 Newspaper editors, if indeed they are concerned with objectivity, should be aware 
 of the impact of mug shots accompanying stories and exercise care in their selection. 
 . . . Likewise, it is caveat emptor for the consumer, the reader.  As he or she strives to 
 be an informed citizen, the reader should do well to remember the mug shot’s 
 contribution . . . to the news story’s tenor and meaning for him or her.186   
 
In sum, despite a neutral characterization of a subject in a news story, the nature of a  
mug shot of the news story subject can ascribe a non-neutral (perhaps, even negative) 
meaning onto a story.  Ultimately, all three studies show how mug shots create a prejudicial 
public impression.187  The research evidence foreshadows negative implications for 
defendants whose mug shots appear in the press.   
1. Implications of Social Science Research on the Release of Mug Shots 
 The three social science studies188 illustrate the justifications for keeping certain 
information private.189  Namely, mug shot photographs can lead to misjudgment about a 
defendant.  Whereas the research above190 differentiates between hypothetical smiling and 
non-smiling defendants, real life defendants will most likely not be smiling for their mug 
shots.  Posing for a mug shot is not a celebratory moment.  Imagine taking a mug shot “after 
being accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties.”191 Clearly, a person 
generally does not have time to look attractive by putting on make-up, combing his or her 
hair, and wearing his or her best attire for a mug shot photo.  Rather, a person may look 
distressed or even hostile as he or she realizes that the camera will capture the pain and 
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embarrassment of having a criminal record.  As one person explained, “[m]ug shots 
showcase us at our lowest point, stripped of all trappings that made us look like kings.   
They reveal what we in fact are: Flawed, Possibly Drunk Human Beings in Bad Lighting.”192    
In essence, mug shots capture only one moment in a defendant’s entire life span.  A 
photograph capturing one moment cannot accurately reveal any characteristics about a 
person.  Nonetheless, the research shows that people will make judgments about a 
defendant in a mug shot.193   
 Unfortunately, the social science research implies that society will not judge real-life 
subjects of mug shots with leniency, given that most defendants will not smile or look 
attractive in their mug shots.  These judgments are unreasonable, as they are based on 
impartial information about a person.  The Millicent H. Abel et al. study indicates that the 
public will not have a lenient attitude towards a real-life person who looks guilty in his mug 
shot.194  Furthermore, the Marianne LaFrance et al. study suggests that the public is not 
likely to give a real-life defendant in a mug shot the benefit of the doubt, regardless of the  
defendant’s guilt.195   
 One possible argument in favor of releasing mug shots is that a criminal record  
documenting arrest or conviction has more of a negative stigma than releasing an 
unflattering mug shot.  This argument would hold that releasing a mug shot does not 
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implicate privacy, because the public can easily access arrest and conviction records.  
However, the Lain et al. study196 shows that mug shots have an impact over and above 
having a criminal record of arrest and conviction in the first place.  On paper, a crime may 
appear minor, but a really unflattering mug shot can exacerbate perceptions about the 
seriousness of the crime that a defendant committed, just as a negative mug shot can 
negatively color a neutral newspaper story.197 Nobody wants to associate with a person 
whom they deem has committed a serious crime.    The Lain et al. research results198 show 
the power of an unflattering mug shot and how people can unreasonably magnify negative 
judgments of a defendant in a mug shot.  Based on the justifications that Solove and other 
commentators199 voice for privacy, the Lain et al. results200 contradict Detorit Free Press’ 
contention that a defendant in a mug shot does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when he or she has appeared in court.201  Ultimately, a mug shot uniquely 
implicates defendants’ privacy rights.  
 In short, social science research shows how the release of mug shots violates 
defendants’ reasonable expectations of privacy.  Recall that law enforcement takes mug 
shots of defendants before a jury convicts defendants of guilt.  Unfortunately, social science 
shows that mug shot photos are not judgment-free.  Most people publicize only their most 
flattering pictures and hide their least desirable photographs.  Mug shots are not 
representative of people at their best moments.  People appreciate the benefit of the doubt, 
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but a defendant in a mug shot, who most likely does not look attractive or happy, will not 
receive this benefit of the doubt.   Congress amended FOIA Exemption 7(c) in 1986 to 
protect the privacy rights of innocent individuals in law enforcement records or 
information.202  However, studies indicate that the public will not give the subjects of mug 
shots a benefit of the doubt, which is contrary to the idea behind Exemption 7(c)’s 
protections.   Not only do mug shots expose a moment that defendants prefer to keep 
private, but also prevent them from controlling their reputations.  Mug shots implicate 
privacy interests, because they represent incomplete information about a person.  In turn, 
people use this incomplete information to make snap judgments about defendants, which, 
subsequently, affect defendants’ standing in society.  People will view a defendant with a 
mug shot with suspicion, rather than with warm acceptance.  Essentially, releasing mug 
shot photos violates defendants’ reasonable expectation to privacy and ultimately violates 
the spirit of FOIA Exemption 7(c).  
B. Mug Shots’ Effects Last Beyond the End of a Criminal Trial 
 Part B will show that mug shots negatively impact defendants long after the 
conclusion of a criminal trial.  The research in Part A indicates that people have negative 
attitudes—in the form of minimal leniency and benefit of the doubt—towards subjects of 
mug shot photos.  The ensuing discussion presents three social science publications that 
show the great longevity and strength of those negative attitudes.  These publications will 
ultimately illustrate how mug shot disclosures violate FOIA Exemption 7(c).   
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 The first study, through a series of experiments, found that people have a negativity 
bias,203 which the study defines as the “greater sensitivity to negative information.”204  
Specifically, the study wanted to determine whether negativity bias operates at the 
evaluative-categorization stage.205  The evaluative-categorization stage is when people first 
process information into categories (e.g., negative, positive, or neutral) about a person or 
object that they encounter.206  In the second experiment of the study, researchers 
presented participants with pictures depicting positive, negative, or neutral stimuli.207  
Researchers instructed participants to evaluate whether the picture they saw “showed 
something they found positive, negative, or neutral.”208  The study explained, “[w]hen 
people naturally evaluate objects in their environment, it is more likely that they choose 
from a full range of evaluative responses, which includes positivity, negativity, and 
neutrality.”209   
 As participants evaluated the pictures, the researchers measured the participants’  
late positive potential (LPP), which measure “changes in electocortical activity that occur in  
response to discrete stimuli.”210  Specifically, the LPP shows how people emotionally  
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process information.211  The amplitude of the LPP reflects the extent to which an individual 
in engaging in emotional processing.212 The researchers hypothesized that “if the negativity 
bias operates at the evaluative-categorization stage, it should manifest itself as larger LPPs 
to evaluatively negative pictures as compared with positive pictures.”213 The researcher’s 
hypothesis was correct and results showed the “operation of a negativity bias at the 
evaluative-categorization stage of information processing.”214  In other words, people are 
more sensitive to negative information than to positive information when they first form an 
impression of an individual by evaluating him or her.  Thus, this study suggests that people 
have greater sensitivity to a negative mug shot photo than to a positive photo of an 
individual.   
 In a second study, Steven L. Neuberg found that negative information about an  
individual creates a negative expectancy for that person.215 In simulated interviews, 
researchers gave interviewers negative information about one applicant and no 
information about another applicant.216 Researchers encouraged half of the interviewers to 
form accurate impressions about the applicants (“the accuracy-goal condition”), while the 
other half of the interviewers received no encouragement (“the no-goal condition”).217  
Results indicate, “interviewers in the no-goal condition formed more negative impressions 
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of the negative-expectancy applicants than of the no-expectancy applicants [the applicants 
on whom the interviewers did not receive any information].”218 Meanwhile, negative 
information about an applicant did not influence the judgments of the interviewers in the 
accuracy-goal condition.219  Given that mug shots are an example of negative information in 
society, this study essentially predicts that the public will characterize subjects of mug 
shots from a visceral, rather than from a rational level.  The public is more likely to make 
the worst assumptions about an individual in a mug shot, rather than make an effort to 
empathize or fully understand the individual. 
 Finally, a research survey reviewing studies across a wide range of psychological 
phenomena gives firm support to the proposition that negative information has a stronger 
impact on people than positive information.220  For instance, for the psychological 
phenomenon of impression formation, the survey affirms, “[i]n general, and apart from a 
few carefully crafted exceptions, negative information receives more processing and 
contributes more strongly to the final impression than does positive information.  Learning 
something bad about a new acquaintance carries more weight than learning something 
good, by and large.”221  In its review of studies on stereotype formation, the survey 
conclusively summarizes, “bad reputations are easy to acquire but difficult to lose, whereas  
good reputations are difficult to acquire but easy to lose.”222  The survey essentially  
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summarizes its findings through “the general principal that bad is stronger than good.”223  
Thus, if an employer saw a mug shot, a negative characteristic, of an applicant, and also 
learned that the applicant is a hero, a positive characteristic, then the negative 
characteristic of having a mug shot will contribute more strongly to the employer’s 
impression of the applicant than the positive characteristic of being a hero.   Moreover, any 
negative reputation that a defendant acquires from a mug shot will be difficult to abandon.  
1.  Implications of Social Science Research on the Release of Mug Shots 
 The three studies essentially indicated that negative information, in this case, mug 
shot appearances, has a stronger impact than positive information on a person’s 
impression of another person.224  The salient negative features of a defendant in a mug shot 
can lead to long-lasting and overly negative judgments about the defendant.  Thus, the 
studies provide evidence for why mug shots should remain private, because they exemplify 
the argument that “[k]nowing certain information can distort one’s judgment of another  
rather than increase its accuracy.”225  For instance, in the Neuberg study, only the  
interviewers who were encouraged by researchers to form an accurate impression of 
applicants did not let negative information bias their appraisal of the applicants.226  
However, in real life, individuals do not have researchers to encourage them to view a mug 
shot with an open mind.  Rather, studies ultimately suggest that people will react with  
hasty, overly emotional, and inaccurate judgments if they view an individual’s mug shot.227  
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 The internet has only exacerbated the public’s uninformed judgments about mug 
shots.  People can easily access mug shots through the internet.  When people view mug 
shots on the internet, they are most likely viewing the photo of a stranger whom they have 
little interest in knowing accurately.  Solove paraphrases sociologist Erving Hoffman’s 
theory that, “[w]hen we first meet somebody, we have little invested in that person. . . . So if 
we learn about a piece of that person’s private life that seems bizarre or unpleasant, it’s 
easy to just walk away. . . . With time to gain familiarity with a person, we’re better able to 
process information, see the whole person, and weigh secrets in context.”228 Unfortunately, 
the people who “just walk away” can be potential employers, friends, and spouses.  
 Three hypothetical examples illustrate just how irrational judgments on mug shots 
impact the defendant, the defendant’s family, and society long after the end of a criminal 
trial.   These examples show some of the arguments for why certain information should 
remain private.  First, disclosing mug shots will negatively impact a defendant’s 
rehabilitation into society and hence, privacy is necessary to “further society’s interest in 
providing people with incentives and room to grow and change.”229  Assume a falsely 
arrested person whose mug shots law enforcement has released to the media.  Lois Wilson 
is such a person and she recounted the effect of her mug shot on a sheriff department 
website: “I don’t like that—that’s not who I am.  People look at you differently now . . . 
everybody is telling you you’re guilty.”230  The reactions that Wilson receives are not 
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surprising.  Education has not been completely effective in fighting stigma.231 For instance, 
despite the highly public campaigns educating citizens on AIDS, many people still make 
faulty assumptions on the causes of AIDS.232  Accordingly, even a disclaimer next to 
Wilson’s mug shot proclaiming “This person is innocent until proven guilty” may not 
effectively eradicate her association with guilt.   
 Second, assume that a newspaper publishes the mug shot of a person whom a jury 
has given a life sentence.  One possible argument holds that a person with a life sentence 
already has enough privacy from society and thus, the release of this person’s mug shots 
has a meaningless impact on his or her privacy rights.  However, this person in jail may 
have family members.  Perhaps these family members have an interest in withholding the 
release of a mug shot.  The release of an incarcerated person’s mug shots implicates the 
privacy rights of family members.  Penny Wood provides an example of how the release of 
her unflattering mug shot affected her family.233 In a plea bargain deal, Wood agreed to let 
law enforcement publish photographs of her for a campaign to show the damages of 
methamphetamine use.234  Wood detailed how her grandson feared humiliation at school 
from the release of the photos.235   
 A defendant’s mug shot does not always accurately portray his or her family, but 
Wood’s example shows how people could judge an entire family by the mug shot of just one 
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family member.  This inaccurate judgment is a prime reason for why scholars like Solove 
justify the privacy of certain information.236  Note that the Supreme Court in National 
Archives and Records Administration v. Favish held that FOIA recognized “surviving family 
members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative’s death-scene 
images.”237  Only an illogical result would emerge if Favish’s FOIA ruling did not apply to 
family members of individuals serving a life sentence.  Innocent family members should not 
suffer privacy right violations for the mistakes of a close relative. 
 Third, suppose a jury convicted a defendant of fraud and sentenced him or her to 
ten years in prison.  Also presume that this defendant is a “business genius.”  Finally, 
assume that the defendant has learned from his mistakes during his jail sentence and hopes 
to become a contributing member of society after leaving jail.  Despite this defendant’s 
moral failings of committing fraud, he clearly has many valuable skills that he can 
contribute to the workforce.  However, research establishes the stigma of having a mug 
shot photo by showing the strength and longevity of the public’s negative attitudes.238  
Basically,  “people with stigma are often shunned or not fully accepted by society.”239 
Accordingly, protection from disclosure of mug shot photographs “permits room to change, 
to define oneself and one’s future without become a ‘prisoner of [one’s] recorded past.’ 
Society has a tendency to tie people too tightly to the past and to typecast people in 
particular roles. . . . Society benefits, however, when people can rehabilitate themselves and 
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start new, more productive lives.”240  Unfortunately, studies suggest241 that if the 
government discloses mug shots, then defendants in those mug shots will not be able to 
change themselves in the public eye and will not be able to benefit society if they have 
immense talents.  In other words, mug shot disclosures could lead to the “de-
democratization” of society that Solove warns could result from the absence of privacy.242   
 In sum, social science undermines Detroit Free Press’ contention that the need to 
protect privacy diminishes in an ongoing trial where the defendant has already  
appeared.243  Specifically, social science supports how the release of mug shots violates a 
defendant’s reasonable expectation to privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(c).  Mug shots need 
privacy protection, because studies indicate that not only will people make inaccurate and 
negative conclusions about defendants in a mug shot, but they will also hold those 
conclusions long after a criminal trial ends.  While attorneys, who are experts in public 
relations, guide their clients on how to behave during a trial, they are generally not present 
to remind their clients to take the “perfect” mug shot photo.  Thus, mug shots are the most 
candid portrayal of an individual at his or her most vulnerable moment.  The studies244 
indicate how one negative mug shot can overshadow any “perfect” behavior during a trial.  
However, the negative impression that people form from seeing just one mug shot is not 
always accurate.    
 When law enforcement releases mug shots, the public is able to invade the  
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defendant’s privacy beyond a defendant’s trial and beyond a criminal’s sentence.  The 
American legal system promotes the principle that criminals who served their sentence 
have paid their debts to society and should no longer reimburse society.245  However, mug 
shots are a permanent record of a private episode of defendants’ lives.   The invasion of 
privacy from disclosing mug shots perpetually affects a defendant’s rehabilitation into 
society and a defendant’s innocent family members.  FOIA Exemption 7(c) does not create 
an unlimited access to a defendant’s criminal record.  Moreover, FOIA Exemption 7(c) 
clearly does not condone the privacy intrusion of family members with relatives whose 
names appear in law enforcement records.   However, the release of mug shots crosses the 
boundary of reasonable expectation to privacy that FOIA Exemption 7(c) established.  As 
Solove explains, the value of privacy lies in its value to society.  Because “[e]veryone must 
cope with the fragility of reputation,” society values privacy protections of embarrassing 
private information.246  Social science shows how damaging mug shot disclosures can be to 
a defendant’s reputation.247  Talented defendants with negative reputations will 
undoubtedly find difficulty in contributing to society.  This difficulty from the disclosure of 
mug shots translates into a disadvantage for society.  Thus, mug shots need privacy 
protection.   
C. Mug Shot Disclosures have an Inconclusive Effect on Public Benefit 
 In their famous1890 Harvard Law Review article, Warren and Brandeis articulated  
that a privacy law should: 
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protect those persons whose affairs the community has no legitimate 
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and 
to protect all  persons, whatsoever their position or station, from having 
matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against 
their will.248 
 
In addition to showing the perpetual negative attitudes towards subjects of mug shot  
photos, social science research indicates that any public benefit derived from releasing mug 
shot photographs is inconclusive, if not minimal.  Two popular arguments support the 
release of mug shots, but research does not adequately support these arguments.  
 The first argument that supports mug shot disclosure is public shaming.  Law 
enforcement officials believe that publicizing mug shots will create deterrence for crime.  
For instance, one city considered posting DUI mug shots on Facebook.  The councilman 
behind the proposal explained, “If it takes shaming people to save lives, I am willing to do  
it.”249  Essentially the theory behind posting mug shots is that the shame and  
embarrassment from having strangers see one’s mug shot will deter the subject of the mug 
shot and other individuals from committing crime.   
 Although posting mug shots will undoubtedly deter some criminal activity,  “[b]oth  
the psychological and the anthropological works indicate that the general deterrence and 
expressive effects of shame measures are likely to be highly contextual and 
unpredictable.”250  For instance, some individuals commit crimes from an addiction or 
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compulsion, in which case, shame punishment may not be effective.251  In fact, some 
psychologists assert that shame is the root of certain crimes, thus punishing an individual 
with shame is counter-productive.252  In addition, some psychological research suggests 
shame punishment causes anger and a drive to retaliate against the person administering 
the punishment.253   Conversely, research also theorizes that “[s]hame has a way of 
alienating people, inhibiting their ability to rehabilitate and reintegrate themselves into the  
community.”254  For example, the stigma associated with shame punishment leaves 
criminals “with no hope of becoming a productive member of society,” and may “produce 
the feeling that improvement and change is hopeless.”255 Essentially, the effect of using  
mug shots photographs for punishment is inconclusive.   
 The second argument holds that mug shots serve as public notice to people about  
criminals, such as sexual offenders, who live in their neighborhoods.256  Solove concedes 
that “information can be highly relevant .  . . especially when a person with a history of 
violent criminal conduct has contact with children.”257 Under Megan’s Law, parents “have 
the right to find out the names of . . .  sex offenders, their photos, their addresses. . . .”258  
Mug shots may help parents identify a neighborhood sex offender more so than simply 
knowing an offender’s name and address from a sex offender registration list.  While 
                                                        
251 Id. at 24. 
252 Id. at 24. 
253 Id. at 5. 
254 Solove, supra note 228, at 95. 
255 Jocelyn Ho, Note, Incest And Sex Offender Registration: Who Is Registration Helping And 
Who Is It Hurting?, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 429, 443 (2008). 
256 See also Solove, supra note 114, at 1055. 
257 Id. at 1056. 
258NATIONAL ALERT REGISTRY, MEGAN’S LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHO MEGAN’S LAW OFFENDERS ARE.,  
http://www.registeredoffenderslist.org/megans-law.htm; Solove, supra note 114, at 1059. 
Lisa Chinai 
Circuit Review Comment 
AWR Submission 
05/14/12 
shielding children from sexual offenders is a compelling interest, this interest does not 
always justify overriding privacy rights.  In fact, mug shot disclosures of sexual offenders 
may unnecessarily invade privacy interests.   
 First, studies on the effect of Megan’s Law are scanty and the few studies available 
report inconclusive results.  One commentator lamented, “[s]tate and federal governments 
have not been proactive in commissioning studies as to the effectiveness of registration in 
preventing future sex offenses.  They have likewise failed to make inquiries into how these 
registries affect victims. . . .”259 A 2008 study shows no effect in sexual offense recidivism in 
New Jersey.260  However, “there is also not much proof that Megan’s Laws fail.”261   Thus,  
mug shot disclosures do not necessarily protect the safety of children.   
 Second, “[w]hile many assume that sex crimes are perpetrated by strangers, such as  
the mysterious neighbor who lives down the street, most sex offenses are perpetrated by 
family members or people who know the victim.” 262 In fact, under one estimate, family 
members or close family friends commit 92% of sexual offenses against children.263  Thus, 
Megan’s Law is often useless in identifying sex offenders because most parents know the 
sex offender.  Moreover, Megan’s Law also lists “harmless” offenders like high school 
students convicted for having sex with their underage boyfriends or girlfriends.264 
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Essentially, the release of mug shots unnecessarily invades the privacy rights of neighbors 
with sexual offense convictions.   
 Unfortunately, mug shot disclosures can have unintended effects.  For instance, 
“Megan’s Laws may stigmatize the very victims of sex offenses whom they are designed to 
protect, many of whom are children living in the same house as the sex offender.”265  
Research also shows that sex offenders loose jobs and experience difficulty adjusting into 
society, which in turn, can increase the likelihood that they may return to committing 
crimes.266  Inevitably, sexual offense will occur in some neighborhoods, just as any other 
crime.  However, the possibility of sexual offense should not always supersede laws that 
protect privacy.  Essentially, mug shot disclosures do not conclusively benefit the public’s 
protection of children.   
 Instead of aiding the criminal justice system, mug shot disclosures provide 
entertainment fodder to the public.  Mug shots have become trendy features for 
publications and websites.  Jail, Cellmates, Busted, and Gotch-ya! are examples of 
publications devoted exclusively to mug shots.267  These publications sell for one dollar and 
provide “little editorial content outside photographs, names, and charges.”268 The Orlando 
Sentinel digital news manager attested that mug shot postings created a “huge traffic” for 
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the paper.269  In fact, the Sentinel mug shot webpage draws about 2.5 million views a 
month.270  Clearly, not all of those 2.5 million views were from crime victims hoping to 
identify crime suspects.  A journalism professor explained that viewing mug shots is akin to 
enjoying a horror movie.271  The professor further explained, “[t]hese [mug shots] are 
pictures of monsters who actually exist, and we can look at them from the safety of 
wherever we are, and they disappear when we close the book.”272  The mug shot 
publications essentially provide the kind of idle gossip that Warren and Brandeis in 1890 
and Solove in the twenty-first century feel is a reason for keeping truthful information 
private.273  The public’s pleasure-seeking voyeuristic interests should never trump a  
person’s privacy interest in withholding the release of a mug shot. 
V.  Conclusion 
 If the Supreme Court decides to review the split between the Sixth and Eleventh  
Circuits, the Court should side with the Karantsalis decision.  First, the legislative history of 
FOIA Exemption 7(c) is more aligned with the Karantsalis holding than it is with the Detroit 
Free Press holding.  Second, blackmail laws, Warren’s and Brandeis’ famous law review 
article, and privacy tort law all point to an American legal tradition that uses privacy as a 
legal right to protect reputations.  Thus, Karantsalis has a more realistic view of privacy 
rights than does Detroit Free Press.   Social science research more heavily supports 
Karantsalis’ view of privacy rights than the views of Detroit Free Press.  Hence, social 
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science firmly supports the legislative intent of FOIA Exemption 7(c).   Finally, any benefit 
that the public receives from the release of mug shots is trivial compared to the privacy 
invasions of defendants.  
 Despite the strong social science support against the release of mug shots, 
discussions of privacy inevitably elicit questions on the public’s right to know.  Specifically, 
an inquiry generally arises on how to balance legitimate public need for mug shot 
disclosures and Exemption 7(c)’s protection of privacy.  For instance, in Karantsalis, the 
plaintiff argued that the public needed Giro’s mug shot photo because Giro’s demeanor in  
the photograph could reveal whether law enforcement gave him preferential treatment.274   
Note that the Supreme Court has spelled out certain categorical standards that balance the  
public’s right to know and privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(c).  For example, in Favish, the 
court held that “[i]n the case of photographic images and other data pertaining to an 
individual who died under mysterious circumstances,”275 the requester of information 
protected by Exemption 7(c) must show evidence that would “warrant a belief by a 
reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.”276  To 
address the balance between legitimate public need for disclosure and privacy protections 
under FOIA Exemption 7(c), the Supreme Court could extend the Favish standard 
specifically to mug shot photographs if it decides to review the split between the Eleventh 
and the Sixth Circuits.  In general, the law should presume that mug shot disclosures violate 
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a person’s reasonable expectation to privacy, unless the requester of the mug shot photos 
puts forth evidence satisfying the Favish standard.      
 In sum, social science shows that “disclosures of information about a person will not 
enhance our ability to judge . . . in fact, it may distort our assessments.”277  This distortion 
starkly contrasts with FOIA’s overall goal to create an openness, honesty, and transparency.  
Moreover, reputation distortion certainly runs afoul against Exemption 7(c)’s goal to 
protect individuals whose information appears in law enforcement records.  Mug shot 
disclosures are not merely embarrassing; they detrimentally impact a whole range of 
sociological factors that last beyond a criminal trial.    Essentially, mug shot disclosures 
unreasonably invade the privacy rights of the individual in a mug shot, with little to no 
corresponding advantages for society.  
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